Indonesia’s Botched Flood Response

Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Southeast Asia Brief.

The highlights this week: Indonesia still in crisis over the floods, Thailand-Cambodia border clashes, Myanmar is the world’s opium hub, and Chinese cars are piling pressure on regional manufacturers.

As we were finalizing the newsletter this week, a new round of fighting broke out along the Thai-Cambodian border. Previous clashes had already seen Thailand suspend their peace deal. Now conflict is reaching a level of intensity reminiscent of the brief July war, with serious potential for further escalation.

The spark seems to have been a clash between Thai and Cambodian troops along a disputed stretch of border on Sunday, Dec. 7. Both sides accused the other of firing first.

After things escalated, on Monday, Thailand reported the death of one Thai soldier and eight others injured. The Cambodian government has claimed four civilians have been killed and nine injured by Thai strikes.

Meanwhile, citizens on both sides of the border are fleeing. The Thai military says it has evacuated more than 385,000 civilians from border areas. The Cambodian government says that it has evacuated 1,157 families to safe areas.

Numerous factors seem to have come together to make the floods so severe. The floods are the result of a cyclone—a rare weather event for Indonesia. Deforestation may have also worsened the flood’s impact.

The main problem now, however, is the slow pace of relief. Roads damaged by floods and landslides have left huge areas inaccessible and dangerously low on supplies. “People are not dying from the flood, but from starvation,” Aceh Gov. Muzakir Manaf told media.

Locals who spoke to FP over the phone described a situation of being left to fend for themselves. “Aid took a very long time to arrive. No aid arrived on the first day after the incident,” Fahri, a local activist in Matur, West Sumatra, said.

Even in major cities like Padang, the capital of West Sumatra, the situation remains grim. Victims in homes inundated with mud—sometimes up to their knees or thighs—need equipment to dig out, Novi Rovika, a local, said. She described the mud as hardening in the hot weather and also said there is a lack of temporary housing to shelter people.

Notably, the government has declined to declare a national emergency, instead terming relief a “national priority,” a classification that carries no actual legal status. Declaring a national emergency would, among other things, allow the government to request or welcome international assistance. Instead, the government has pointedly refused aid, saying it is not needed.

“National pride, influenced by domestic politics, is undermining humanitarian needs,” Mizan Bisri, principal researcher for Southeast Asia at Asian Disaster Reduction Center, said. Bisri noted a lack of tents, clean water, and search-and-rescue capabilities. Local officials are warning of potential starvation if the situation continues.

The shoddy government response appears to be sparking growing public anger, exacerbated by the apparent tone-deafness of some political figures. The head of the national disaster relief agency initially downplayed the situation’s seriousness, saying it was exaggerated on social media. Meanwhile, a presidential aide turned his visit with President Prabowo Subianto to flood-stricken areas into an Instagram lifestyle video.

A South African national, Ben Mauerberger, aka Ben Smith, allegedly worked with Yim Leak to launder money. Reporting by Whale Hunting, an outlet run by the two former Wall Street Journal journalists who broke the 1MDB scandal, said he had links to former Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, for whom he apparently served as an advisor.

Furthermore, the day after the most recent raid, a photo surfaced showing Mauerberger with Prime Minister Anutin Charnvirakul and Finance Minister Ekniti Nitithanprapas. Anutin has acknowledged meeting Mauerberger but said it took place in 2014, that they were not close, and denied having any business dealings with him. Mauerberger has denied all claims made against him by Whale Hunting.

Myanmar opium production booms. Opium production in Myanmar has hit a 10-year high. The area under cultivation for opium is up 17 percent compared to 2024, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, and has risen steadily since 2021, when civil war broke out in response to the military’s coup.

Shan state, in particular South Shan, is the most important production hub, accounting for 88 percent of the area under cultivation. The state is a patchwork with different parts controlled by the military and various armed ethnic groups. However, it is interesting to note cultivation is particularly intensive in the area around Taunggyi, a town the junta has a relatively firm grip on.

For local farmers, the military, and armed ethnic groups alike, the opiate economy—which the report estimates was worth $641 million to $1.1 billion in 2024—is a handy source of cash. Production is getting more organized, with yields per acre rising. The Taliban’s sharp curtailment of opium production in Afghanistan has also boosted prices worldwide while making Myanmar the world’s largest producer. The report notes Myanmar heroin seems to be spreading into new markets, such as Europe, once supplied by Afghanistan.

Nationalist, influencer, war criminal? A fascinating look at Gun Jompalang, a Thai social media influencer who allegedly launched psychological warfare efforts against Cambodian civilians, by Surachanee Sriyai in Fulcrum.

How Malaysia and Cambodia signed deals with the United States that implicitly required them to follow U.S. restrictions on exports of sensitive goods to China, by Shannon Teoh in the Straits Times.

“Don’t shoo us away as if we’re stray cats.” Expanding graveyards are threatening to displace Jakarta’s poor, by Gembong Hanung in the Jakarta Post.

2. The number of times the words “Southeast Asia” appear in the U.S. National Security Strategy. Many in the region might be quietly relieved that under President Donald Trump we see a rare piece of continuity in U.S. foreign policy: ignoring Southeast Asia.

China’s booming global electric vehicle (EV) industry is putting serious pressure on established players in America, Japan, and Europe. Is the same happening in Southeast Asia?

Locked out of U.S. markets, Chinese producers are looking for sales elsewhere—and Southeast Asia is an important region. So far, the experience seems to be bruising for countries that have a significant auto sector, namely Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia.

Ideally, these countries want to attract Chinese companies to produce domestically, but this has been slow to manifest. In Thailand, dubbed the Detroit of Asia and the region’s largest EV market, imported Chinese models made up 85 percent of EV sales in 2024, according to the International Energy Agency. Local producers, facing competition and collapsing domestic sales, are struggling.

The picture is not much better elsewhere. Indonesia is also importing most of its rapidly growing EV segment—and plans to attract production into the country have met with only limited success. There are warning signs that manufacturers in Malaysia are under pressure. And, while Vietnam’s homegrown EV brand, VinFast, has sold tens of thousands of cars domestically, it has also racked up losses of hundreds of millions of dollars. Even factories producing cars are struggling as petrol cars produced in China flood the region.

Why does this matter? Auto industries are important for three of these four economies. For a long time, Southeast Asia has tended to look on China favorably, integrating economically with it and welcoming its investment. Now, however, Southeast Asia is facing a situation similar to Europe, worrying China’s vast production will diminish prized domestic industries. Were the United States not so determined to shoot itself in the foot with tariffs, there could be an opportunity to court Southeast Asian countries as better economic partners.