Pakistan is seeking to convert recent battlefield claims and shifting geopolitical alignments into diplomatic and commercial leverage, according to Pakistani officials and regional analysts.
Pakistan’s domestically assembled JF-17 Thunder fighter jet, and its performance against India, have been at the centre of an ambitious drive to expand defence exports.
From the oil-rich Gulf to North Africa and Southeast Asia, Islamabad is marketing the multi-role aircraft as a combat-tested, lower-cost alternative to western platforms, targeting countries constrained by budget limitations or wary of the political conditions that accompany major arms deals with the United States and Europe.
Pakistan’s sales pitch was buoyed after a four-day air confrontation with India in May 2025, which Pakistani officials cite as a real-world demonstration of the country’s integrated air-combat capabilities.
Although the military balance sheet of the clash remains contested, Islamabad has seized on the episode to recast the JF-17 as not only affordable but operationally credible.
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The JF-17 Thunder Block III is a single-engine, fourth-generation fighter jointly developed by the Pakistan Aeronautical Complex and China’s Chengdu Aircraft Corporation and assembled in Pakistan.
Long promoted as a budget-friendly option for smaller air forces, the aircraft is now being presented by Pakistani officials as a frontline platform capable of operating in high-intensity conflict.
Analysts believe interest has risen across the Middle East, Africa, and parts of Eurasia, as geopolitical realignments prompt states to look beyond traditional western suppliers.
Concrete details of potential contracts remain closely guarded, however, with most information emerging through unnamed official sources rather than signed agreements.
Raza Hayat Hiraj, Pakistan’s minister for defence production, told BBC Urdu this week that talks were “underway” with several countries for the sale of the JF-17, declining to name them and describing the negotiations as involving “protected secrets”.
Combat as credentials
The export drive gained momentum after the four-day confrontation with India, the most intense exchange between the two air forces in decades.
The precise balance of losses remains contested, but Islamabad has highlighted one symbolic claim in particular: that Pakistani aircraft brought down at least one of India’s French-made advanced Rafale fighters. New Delhi has neither confirmed nor denied the assertion.
Whether or not the engagement altered the strategic equation, it achieved something just as valuable in the arms trade: it gave Pakistan a narrative.
‘The JF-17 is no longer just a budget option, but a battle-tested one’
– Muhammad Shoaib, Quaid-i-Azam University
For years, Pakistan struggled to move the JF-17 beyond its reputation as a “budget” alternative to western jets, but the skirmish with India changed everything.
“The Pakistan Air Force demonstrated superior performance against more expensive western platforms, including French-made Rafales,” Muhammad Shoaib, assistant professor at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, told Middle East Eye. “This proved the JF-17 is no longer just a budget option, but a battle-tested one.”
He also noted that, unlike western systems, the JF-17 is exempt from the “political vetoes” and usage restrictions typically attached to American or European exports.
That message has been amplified by US President Donald Trump, who has repeatedly praised Pakistani aviation performance while taking credit for the subsequent ceasefire – a claim that New Delhi flatly denies.
Such endorsements are unusual in US-Pakistan relations, which have long been defined by mutual mistrust. But for Pakistani defence marketers, they have become a powerful tool.
However, some analysts say the recent foreign interest is driven less by the aircraft itself and more by the perceived performance of the Pakistan Air Force.
“Countries looking to make deals are impressed by the PAF after its performance in the May conflict with India and the combat learning and training derived from it,” Abdul Basit, senior associate fellow at Singapore’s S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, told MEE.
“In return, they are more inclined to purchase the JF-17.”
Africa as a testing ground
Pakistan has already exported the JF-17 to Azerbaijan, Myanmar, and Nigeria. Indonesia’s defence minister recently met Pakistan’s air force chief to discuss the possible purchase of the JF-17 and other defence products. In Bangladesh, the political upheaval that followed the 2024 ousting of Sheikh Hasina has opened space for a recalibration of defence ties.
And in Iraq, Pakistani military diplomacy has intensified after a high-level visit by the air force chief to Baghdad in January, with Iraqi officials expressing “keen interest” in both the JF-17 and Pakistan’s Super Mushshak trainer aircraft, Pakistani state-run PTV reported.
But the strategy is yielding its most tangible dividends in Africa, a continent where great-power rivalry, internal conflicts, and expanding arms markets increasingly intersect.
Sudan and Libya, however, mark a qualitative shift: from limited sales to politically consequential defence partnerships.
In Sudan, Pakistani officials told Reuters that negotiations are advanced on a defence package valued at about $1.5bn that would include JF-17 Block III fighters, K-8 attack aircraft, and more than 200 drones.
The deal would bolster the Sudanese army, backed by Saudi Arabia and Turkey, in its war against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, which are supported by the United Arab Emirates.
Libya offers an even starker illustration of the trend.
In December, Pakistan’s army chief, Field Marshal General Asim Munir, travelled to Benghazi to meet General Khalifa Haftar, commander of the Libyan National Army (LNA), which controls much of the country’s east and south.
The visit reportedly culminated in a defence agreement valued at more than $4bn, the largest arms export deal in Pakistan’s history, covering JF-17 fighters, Super Mushshak trainers and a range of naval and ground systems.
Although arms transfers to Libya remain politically sensitive under the United Nations embargo framework, Haftar described the agreement as the beginning of a “new phase of strategic military cooperation” with Pakistan, language that reflects how arms deals are increasingly framed as security partnerships rather than simple transactions.
A dozen JF-17s would give the LNA a “game-changing advantage in air power” over the UN-recognised government in Tripoli, which is backed by Turkey, according to a Forbes analysis published in December.
Analysts also warned that such deals illustrate Pakistan’s growing willingness to operate in politically complex theatres.
“These agreements embed Islamabad more deeply in African security calculations,” a western defence official based in Islamabad told MEE. “They also place Pakistan squarely within the competitive space between Gulf powers, China, and, increasingly, Russia and Turkey.”
The Saudi recalibration
Perhaps the most striking sign of Pakistan’s changing role is emerging in its relationship with Saudi Arabia.
‘This is essentially about [Saudi Arabia] supporting Pakistan and building a strategic hedge’
– Ayesha Siddiqa, Pakistani defence analyst
In a development signalling a significant shift in regional defence architecture, Islamabad and Riyadh have signed a Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement. Following a destabilising Israeli strike on Doha in September, the pact commits both nations to treat an attack on one as aggression against both.
Talks have since shifted toward operationalising this alliance through a major procurement package. A recent Reuters report, citing Pakistani sources, suggests both sides are discussing converting $2bn of Saudi sovereign loans into an order for JF-17 fighter jets.
While Pakistan’s foreign ministry maintains it is “unaware” of a formal deal, high-level diplomatic activity suggests serious intent. Pakistan’s air chief recently travelled to Riyadh to meet Lieutenant General Turki bin Bandar bin Abdulaziz, commander of the Royal Saudi Air Force.
Saudi Arabia’s air force remains heavily dependent on western hardware, including F-15s and the Thaad missile defence system. Even with Washington approving F-35 stealth aircraft sales to the kingdom, Riyadh’s interest in Pakistani platforms appears driven more by strategic calculation than tactical necessity.
“Saudi Arabia already has top-of-the-line aircraft; it does not really need the JF-17,” said Ayesha Siddiqa, a Pakistani defence analyst. “This is essentially about supporting Pakistan and building a strategic hedge.”
She cautioned, however, that while the proposal has generated enthusiasm in Pakistan, concrete details remain limited and official confirmation is still pending.
The emerging “hedge” reflects the gradual erosion of confidence in the US-Saudi security paradigm.
Riyadh’s trust was shaken by the muted American response to the 2019 Houthi attacks on oil facilities, the 2021 withdrawal of US missile defences, and the scaling back of support for Saudi operations in Yemen, according to an October analysis by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).
Now Pakistan, with its nuclear deterrent, professional military, and deep ties to China, suddenly appears less like a junior partner and more like a strategic hedge.
Turkish officials have hinted that Ankara is in “advanced” discussions to join the framework, Bloomberg reported, citing sources familiar with the matter, a sign of what analysts describe as a broader recalibration of regional security alliances.
The elephant in the room: China
Yet behind every JF-17 export discussion looms a larger presence: China.
The aircraft may carry a Pakistani flag on its tail, but nearly half its components – especially critical avionics and radar systems – are manufactured in China. Any export deal requires Beijing’s approval.
Pakistani officials acknowledge this openly. “Some components of the JF-17 are manufactured in China, while others are produced in Pakistan,” Defence Production Minister Hiraj told BBC Urdu. “Consequently, China will be a party to any agreement we enter into with third parties.”
Basit characterises China as the “dominant partner” in the relationship, pointing to Beijing’s grip on core technologies and its control over production scaling. Consequently, any surge in global sales demands more than just industrial growth; it requires delicate diplomatic synchronicity with Beijing.
Furthermore, analyst Shoaib notes a strategic advantage for Beijing: many nations desire Chinese hardware but prefer the “Pakistani buffer” to avoid the direct diplomatic friction or “western anger” that comes with buying directly from China.
Economics and capacity
For Pakistan, the stakes are not only strategic but existentially economic.
The country is currently under its twenty-fourth International Monetary Fund (IMF) programme, a $7bn arrangement that followed a last-minute bailout in 2023.
Saudi Arabia and other Gulf allies helped stabilise the economy with deposit rollovers and emergency financing. Now, defence exports are being cast as a pathway out of a permanent crisis.
Pakistan’s defence minister, Khawaja Asif, has recently claimed that the scale of potential orders could one day free Pakistan from reliance on the IMF, a bold assertion that is not yet grounded in economic reality.
Analysts say arms exports alone cannot resolve Pakistan’s structural economic problems, but they could provide a rare source of high-value foreign exchange.
“Even a handful of major contracts would have a meaningful impact on Pakistan’s balance of payments,” an Islamabad-based economist at a multinational firm told MEE, requesting anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue. “But the risk is that expectations are being raised faster than delivery capacity.”
Pakistan has already established a symbolic export record with the JF-17.
Myanmar first ordered 16 aircraft in 2015, followed by Nigeria’s induction in 2021. Azerbaijan became the flagship customer, signing a landmark $1.6bn deal in 2024 for 16 jets, later expanded to 40. By late 2025, Baku formally inducted its first batch of Block III fighters.
Yet serious questions remain about Pakistan’s industrial capacity to meet ambitious export targets.
“France produces only about 25 or 26 Rafale jets a year,” Basit said. “How can Pakistan realistically manufacture far more JF-17s if multiple orders materialise?”
He warned that Islamabad should exercise caution before committing to large-scale deals it may struggle to fulfil, particularly at a time when India is expanding its own air-combat inventory with additional Rafale purchases.
“In such a situation, Pakistan must also keep a close eye on its own stock of JF-17s,” he said, arguing that export enthusiasm should not come at the expense of domestic force readiness.
